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Kimberly Stuart and C. Ford Runge*
The 1996 Federal Agriculture Improvement and Reform Act (FAIR) contained
important breaks with a tradition of crop-by-crop subsidies dating back to the
Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933. Farmers with recorded base acres were given
the opportunity (which nearly all accepted) to sign a seven-year `contract' with the
US Department of Agriculture (USDA), under which payments will be continued
on the merged base acres on a declining schedule until the year 2002. FAIR is an
un®nished agenda. First, the coverage of `freedom to farm' is only partial, with
numerous commodities left out of the decoupling programme. Second, the largest
producers will augment their already signi®cant receipts with generous lump sum
transfers from USDA. This will further reinforce the concentration of roughly 90
per cent of receipts and payments in the hands of the 100000 to 200000 largest
producers of ®eld crops. An alternative would be to make payments in times of low
marketing receipts which recede when prices are high.
1. Introduction and overview
In the scheme of things, the 1996 Federal Agriculture Improvement and
Reform Act (FAIR) contained important breaks with a tradition of crop-
by-crop subsidies dating back to the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933.
It freed many producers of `program commodities' (maize, grain sorghum,
wheat, barley, oats, cotton and rice) from a system of crop-speci®c base
acre accounting, merged these accounts into a single `whole farm base', and
allowed production of any but a few crops on these lands. Through such
`freedom to farm' provisions, payments to farmers were thus decoupled
from these crops. Farmers with recorded base acres were given the opportu-
nity (which nearly all accepted) to sign a seven-year `contract' with the US
Department of Agriculture (USDA), under which payments will be
continued on the merged base acres on a declining schedule until the year
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obligations implied by the previous system of de®ciency payments are
largely ended (for now), resulting in agricultural subsidies that are no
longer open-ended entitlements to future payments from the Federal
Treasury. While signers of the contract with USDA are entitled for seven
years to a per-acre payment (whether or not they produce a crop), the total
amount of these obligations is ®xed at $35.6 billion and therefore predict-
able from a budgetary point of view. Overall, the freedom to produce in
direct response to market forces, rather than on the basis of crop-by-crop
subsidies, as well as the budget discipline of predetermined payments, are
important steps in the direction of decoupled lump-sum compensation.
Yet from the point of view of advocates of policy reform, FAIR is an
un®nished agenda. A number of problems and issues remain. First, the
coverage of `freedom to farm' is only partial, with numerous commodities
left out of the decoupling programme. The mechanisms under which
producers of these absent commodities (dairy products, sugar, peanuts and
tobacco) receive compensation (and they dier) represent relatively low
budget exposure, reinforcing their backburner status. Second, those critical
of the distributive impacts of the commodity programmes ®nd little to
cheer about in the new contracts, and consider the acronym FAIR ironic.
As in the past, those who have accumulated the largest eligibility through
combined acreage bases will receive the largest payments, eectively
limited only to $80000 per operation. Since these payments will be made
over and above any marketing receipts, the largest producers will augment
their already signi®cant receipts with generous lump sum transfers from
USDA. This will further reinforce the concentration of roughly 90 per cent
of receipts and payments in the hands of the 100,000±200,000 largest
producers of ®eld crops. With 1996 market prices near all-time highs due
to short grain stocks world-wide, it is dicult to justify such transfers on
grounds other than pure political expediency. A third and related issue is
whether the contract payments, once decoupled from speci®c crops, should
necessarily be completely divorced from market receipts. An alternative
would be to make them countercyclical, so that payments are made in
times of low marketing receipts and recede in high times such as the
present (see Cochrane and Runge 1992). Fourth, political realists tend to
doubt that the end of the seven-year contract will actually terminate
transfers to these producers, as advertised. Careful observers of the
Congressional Budget Oce `scoring' of spending have noted that $4
billion remains in the 2002 budget for commodity programmes, despite the
alleged end of contract payments in that year.
One of two competing scenarios seems most likely to result. The ®rst
scenario is that global demand-side pressures will cause market prices to
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that case, growing public attention will be focused on large producers who
make enormous marketing receipts, only to receive additional transfers
from the Federal Treasury. If these transfers coincide, as seems likely, with
reductions and income-adjusted `means-testing' of large entitlements
outside agriculture such as Social Security, Medicare and Medicaid, the
transparency of the agricultural transfers will become a source of political
embarrassment and a target for those critical of `welfare for the rich'. The
second scenario is that supply responses induced by current price levels
will lead to substantially lower marketing receipts toward the end of the
seven-year contract (when per acre transfers are in principle phased down
and out). A call will then arise to resuscitate some form of safety net, such
as a return to de®ciency payments or an extension and increase in contract
payments under the 1996 Act beyond 2002. Neither scenario is especially
attractive from the point of view of agricultural policy. In the ®rst case,
farmers are further exposed as already rich recipients of unearned and
unneeded tax dollars. In the second, they and their representatives emerge
as chronic special pleaders, willing to extend inde®nitely a system of
transfers from the public purse, despite signing a seven-year contract that
was supposed to lead to a transition to the market. Avoiding either of
these scenarios, we shall argue, will require frank recognition of the need
for some form of countercyclicity.
One possibility discussed below would be to allow producers to `bank'
transfers in the next several years of high marketing receipts, which could
then be used to trigger pay-outs in years of lower receipts, or eventually be
converted to retirement income. The eect would be to combine counter-
cyclicity with an extension of the coverage of the contract, while retaining
`freedom to farm'. We shall also argue that more explicit connections can
and should be made between such protections and investments in a variety
of environmental and conservation measures, based less on denial of
transfers for failure to comply than on the creation of incentives (including
higher returns for `banked' transfers) for those willing to invest in environ-
mental projects at the farm level.
The article to follow will be divided into three sections: a discussion of
the major provisions of the FAIR Act of 1996; a review of the political
forces leading up to it; and a discussion of reforms that could extend the
incipient agenda that it represents.
2. Summary of 1996 Farm Bill: major provisions
President Clinton signed the Federal Agriculture Improvement and Reform
Act of 1996 (FAIR) on 4 April 1996, following a protracted, politically
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Agricultural Market Transition Act, containing the majority of its reforms;
as well as titles on agricultural trade; conservation; nutrition assistance;
agricultural promotion; credit; rural development; research, extension, and
development; and a miscellaneous title.
2.1 Title I: Agricultural Market Transition Act (Freedom to Farm)
Title I, the Agricultural Market Transition Act (AMTA), contains many
elements of the vetoed 1995 Freedom to Farm Act (FFA). In shorthand,
this title establishes the production contracts for wheat, feed grains, cotton
and rice discussed above. In addition, it continues non-recourse loans,
amends the dairy programme, extends the peanut and sugar programs with
minimal alterations, describes administration of the title, temporarily
suspends permanent law regarding price support authority, establishes the
Commission on 21st Century Production Agriculture, and includes other
commodity provisions.
The AMTA contains most of the reform elements in the 1996 Farm Bill.
Through the creation of transition payments contained in seven-year
production ¯exibility contracts, the Act decouples subsidies from the crop
grown. It also caps spending on agricultural subsidies at $35.6 billion, over
seven years, thus removing them in the aggregate from the entitlement
category. In this sense, the AMTA fundamentally changes the way in
which farm subsidies for the aected crops operate. The previous system,
parts of which dated back to the Great Depression, provided programme
crop farmers with income support in the form of `de®ciency payments',
calculated on the basis of recorded crop acreage and government-set target
prices. When the market prices fell below the target price, farmers received
de®ciency payments equal to the dierence in price to augment their
income. In return for this protection, the government sought to control the
supply of programme crops through acreage reduction programmes (ARP)
(see Young and Shields 1996; Cochrane and Runge 1992). This combina-
tion of simultaneous support and control led to serious distortions in
farming methods and the agricultural economy.
1
1Evert Van der Sluis and Willis Peterson (1994), at the University of Minnesota, recently
completed a detailed evaluation of the impact of crop set-asides on rural employment and
outmigration. Using 40 years of data from 100 randomly selected farming-dependent US
counties (1950±1990), the study found that the larger the number of diverted acres in a
county, the smaller the demand for goods and services supplied by the rural non-farm
population. The negative impacts on rural communities appeared to outweigh any price-
enhancing eects of acreage diversions.
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contracts with ®xed transition payments as the income support mechanism
for farmers. Eligible farmers include those who have participated in
programmes for wheat, feed grains, cotton and rice during the past ®ve
years. The Act eliminates income support de®ciency payments, target
prices, underplanting provisions, acreage reduction programmes (ARPs),
and the Farmer Owned Reserve Program (Hallberg 1996). In doing so, it
severs the connection between subsidies and current farm prices.
In addition, increased planting ¯exibility arises from the separation of
eligible programme acres from the crops planted on the acres. Under
production ¯exibility contracts, 85 per cent of 1996 base acreage computed
under the 1990 Farm Bill (plus or minus Conservation Reserve Program
[CRP] acres) determines payment acres. Under the production ¯exibility
contract guidelines, farmers may plant any commodity they choose with
limitations only on fruits and vegetables. For example, a farmer with 100
acres of programme wheat receives 85 payment acres of wheat whether that
farmer plants wheat, corn, hay, or soybeans (Salathe and Langley 1996).
The new system ends the Farmer Owned Reserve (FOR) and thus removes
the government as a stockholder of commodities. Because the government
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Figure 1 Schedule of contract payments
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sudden shortages.
In addition to decoupling farm subsidies from cropping obligations, the
AMTA caps total annual payments. The Act limits ®scal year total
expenditures to $5.6 billion in 1996, $5.4 billion in 1997, $5.8 billion in
1998, $5.6 billion in 1999, $5.1 billion in 2000, $4.1 billion in 2001, and $4
billion in 2002, thus ending the open-ended entitlement of previous legisla-
tion (®gure 1). While payments decline after 1998 until 2002, they are
generally constant until then. Spending on the basis of previous crop-
speci®c base acreage is prorated, so that 26.26 per cent of total funds will
go to acres previously enrolled as wheat base, 46.22 per cent as corn, 5.11
per cent as sorghum, 2.16 per cent as barley, 0.15 per cent as oats, 11.63
per cent as upland cotton, and 8.47 per cent as rice (®gure 2). The annual
payment rate for each crop depends on the total payment to be allocated,
divided by the estimated eligible production. Within the crop allocation,
farmers receive 85 per cent of contract acreage multiplied by the farm
programme contract yield multiplied by the annual payment rate. Each
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Figure 2 Distribution of contract payments by crop
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higher amount. To see how this would work for an individual farmer
holding 100 contract wheat acres, consider the following example:
Example: Suppose a farmer holds 100 contract acres, the following
USDA example calculates the farmer's 1996 payment for wheat acres
(Salathe and Langley 1996):
Farm contract acres: 100
Contract payment acres: 100 (.85) = 85
Payment production: 2,890
Program yield: 2890/85 = 34
Estimated payment rate for 1996: .94
Estimated payment: (.94) (85) (34) = $2717.00
It should be noted that 100 acres of wheat base is a relatively small
amount. The average wheat farm in the United States in 1992 had an
acreage of 202, but most commercial operations are larger than this
average (USDA 1995c). Production ¯exibility contracts require compliance
with conservation, wetland protection, and planting ¯exibility require-
ments. In brief, these stipulate that a conservation plan be maintained,
that designated wetlands and erosion-prone soils not be disturbed, and
that no fruits or vegetables be grown. In addition, compliance requires
agricultural use of programme acres, precluding development for non-
agricultural uses such as vacation homes. The 1996 Farm Bill adds an
early out option for some land in the Conservation Reserve Program
(CRP) held by farmers who have signed the 7-year production ¯exibility
contracts.
Contract holders remain eligible for non-recourse loans with marketing
loan provisions as under the 1990 Farm Bill (see Vande Kamp and Runge
1994). However, the Act caps the wheat and corn loan rates at relatively
low 1995 levels and sets correspondingly low loan rates for sorghum,
barley, oats, cotton, rice, oilseeds and soybeans. The programmes for
cotton and rice also retain government price guarantees by setting loan
rate ¯oor prices. The Act sets the minimum price for cotton at $0.50 per
pound and for rice at $6.50 per cwt. Individual producers of these crops
face maximum marketing loan gains of $150000 under the three entity
rule. Loan de®ciency payments continue on all loan commodities excluding
ELS cotton. However, since loan rates are so low and current market
prices so high, these payments will generally be small or zero.
The AMTA alters the dairy programme through changes to price
supports, milk marketing orders, and dairy export programmes. Dairy
price support alterations include the cessation of government assessments
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weight under the 1990 Farm Bill), phasing out price supports for butter,
cheese, and powdered milk over 4 years, establishment of a recourse loan
programme and continuation of the Fluid Milk Promotion Program. The
Act provides for the consolidation of the current 33 milk marketing
regions into between 10 to 14 regions. It also consents to the Northeast
Interstate Dairy Compact, a regional price-®xing scheme demanded in
return for his support of the ®nal bill by the leading minority member of
the Senate Agriculture Committee from Vermont. Application of the
scheme was subject to a ®nding of `compelling public interest' on the part
of the Secretary of Agriculture, which he dutifully ful®lled in late 1996,
opening the provision to court challenges from upper-Midwest producers
in Minnesota and Wisconsin. The Act also continues the Dairy Export
Incentive Program.
Despite innovations in wheat, feed grains, cotton and rice, the AMTA
continues the price supports for tobacco without change and leaves the
peanut and sugar programmes largely intact. The minimal changes to the
peanut and sugar programmes illustrate the continuation of market-
distorting policies, although a small achievement was the elimination of
the honey programme, which had a small but well-subsidized constituency.
Modest revisions transform the peanut programme into a `no net cost'
to the government programme, analogous to the sugar programme. While
the programme operates as `no net cost' to the government, it costs
American consumers several hundred million dollars a year in terms of
higher product prices (Rauch 1996). The sugar programme itself continues
as a `no net cost' program, although it was modestly adjusted by freezing
the sugar loan rate, terminating marketing allotments, transforming the
non-recourse loan programme to a recourse loan programme when import
levels drop, and increasing the assessments on sugar processors by 25 per
cent. The principal device supporting domestic prices continues: tari-rate
quotas for sugar imports that keep domestic sugar prices high. Like the
peanut programme, `no net cost' in sugar policy refers to budget expendi-
tures, however, American consumers pay approximately $1 billion a year
in higher prices (Rauch 1996).
Other commodity provisions include: the authorization of the Options
Pilot Program in which farmers are subsidized to participate in hedging
production risks in futures and options markets. More broadly, provisions
exist to support risk management education and the establishment of
an Oce of Risk Management. As part of this complex of risk manage-
ment approaches, provisions direct the implementation of the Revenue
Insurance Pilot Program, which some feel may be a prototype for future
income support policies. However, a separate provision drops the require-
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waive their rights to emergency crop loss assistance. In eect, this
preserves the political opportunity of the Congress to use `emergency
relief' as a form of transfer to constituents adversely aected by weather,
wind and ¯oods.
In summary, Title I changes the mechanism providing farm income
support to some key programme crops from de®ciency payments to transi-
tion payments, caps farm spending, but leaves numerous commodities
largely unaected. In the face of more market orientation, a greater
emphasis is also given to risk management tools. However, much of the
past law remains in the dairy, sugar and peanut programmes as well as the
continuation of non-recourse loans and the retention of permanent law.
2.2 Title II: agricultural trade
Title II amends the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of
1954 and Related Statutes, amends the Agricultural Trade Act of 1978, and
contains additional agricultural trade provisions. Part of the impetus for
adjustments in these parts of the Farm Bill was the 1993 Uruguay Round
agreement in agriculture, which required a revision of spending and the
volume of grain subsidized for export. The new legislation amends the 1978
Trade Act by continuing the Export Credit Guarantee Programs, capping
annual spending on the Export Enhancement Program at $3.2 billion over
the seven years, limiting spending on the Market Access Program (the
renamed Market Promotion Program) to $90 million, providing embargo
compensation under speci®c circumstances and authorizing ®rst-time
statutory authority for the Foreign Market Development Program.
Under amendments to the 1954 Trade Act, the FAIR Act also extends
authority for the Food for Peace (PL 480) programme, a long-standing
foreign assistance programme and vent for US surpluses. It expands PL
480 programme eligibility for low-interest food loans to private entities as
well as foreign governments, and increases PL 480 programme funding
from $13.5 million to $28 million in order to cover administration costs.
Other amendments aecting food aid policy include extension of authority
for the Food for Progress Program, replacement of the Food Security
Wheat Reserve with the Food Security Commodity Reserve, and increased
funding for the Farmer to Farmer Program. Under the Food Security
Commodity Reserve, the commodities that compose the four million
metric ton reserve are expanded from wheat to include any combination of
wheat, rice, corn or sorghum. In addition, the change increased the
amount eligible, per ®scal year, for release to assist overseas relief eorts
from 300000 to 500000 metric tons. Additional agricultural trade provi-
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direction for a new USDA trade strategy. The title also repeals several
Agricultural Acts concerning trade.
2.3 Title III: conservation
Title III extends and alters existing programmes, creates new initiatives and
broadens the conservation agenda with $2.2 billion in additional funding
(Hallberg 1996). The Act retains conservation compliance provisions in
relation to transition payments and other eligibility for cost-sharing and
insurance coverage from WPA (see Title I above). It also clari®es the de®ni-
tions under the land conservation (`sodbuster') provisions, broadens
wetland authority, extends the Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) for
seven years, maintains `swampbuster' provisions, and continues the
Wetlands Reserve Program (WRP) for seven years. Among the most signi®-
cant changes are eorts to better target the Conservation Reserve Program
(CRP), which since 1985 has held more than 36 million acres out of active
crop production. In a period of low stocks and high prices, there is
pressure to bring much of this land back into production. Changes to the
CRP include capping the maximum allowed CRP area at 36.4 million
acres, strengthening the criteria regarding eligible land, and providing an
early out option for land outside of environmentally sensitive areas. The
new legislation caps the maximum WRP area at 975 000 acres. Beginning
in 1997, it splits the area into three equal categories of permanent
easements, 30-year easements, and restoration cost-share agreements.
New programmes funded under Title III include the Environmental
Quality Incentives Program (EQIP), Conservation Farm Option (CFO),
Grazing Lands Conservation Initiative, Wildlife Habitat Incentive
Program, Farmland Protection Program, an initiative for frequently
¯ooded cropland, Everglades Ecosystem Restoration, and the National
Natural Resources Conservation Foundation. EQIP combines the Agricul-
tural Conservation Program, Water Quality Incentives Program, Great
Plains Conservation Program, and the Colorado River Basin Salinity
Control Program in order to coordinate the provision of technical assis-
tance and funding for cost-sharing or ®nancial incentives connected with
conservation and environmental practices. The new law provides EQIP
with $1.3 billion in funding over the seven-year period.
In addition, the title establishes the Environmental Conservation
Acreage Reserve Program (ECARP) to house the Conservation Reserve,
Wetland Reserve and Environmental Quality Incentives Programs.
Furthermore, by including the Wildlife Habitat Incentives Program, the
title widens the conservation focus of the Farm Bill.
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Title IV reauthorizes the Food Stamp Program (FSP) and other smaller
nutrition programmes. The new law extends the Food Stamp Program for
only two years due to the inclusion of the programme in current welfare
reform eorts. Other programmes continue for seven years including the
Commodity Supplemental Food Program (CSFP), Soup Kitchen and
Food Bank, Temporary Emergency Food Assistance Program (TEFAP),
Commodity Distribution Program, Puerto Rico Nutrition Assistance
Program, American Samoa Assistance Program and National Commodity
Processing Program. Separate legislation in 1994 extended the school
lunch and Women, Infant, and Children (WIC) Programs. These
programmes illustrate the substantial transfers to dependent groups in the
form of food assistance, especially in American territories such as Puerto
Rico and Samoa, but also to as many as 1 in 9 Americans living in the
50 states.
2.5 Title V: agricultural promotion
Title V authorizes the establishment of producer-funded programmes for
promotion, research, and education regarding agricultural commodities.
The Act appropriates funds for the promotion of canola and rapeseed,
kiwi fruit, and popcorn as well as extending the programme for ¯uid milk.
The law provides the Agriculture Department with the authority to
establish new producer-funded promotion programmes without prior
congressional approval.
2.6 Title VI: credit
Title VI reauthorizes and revises farm loan programmes, clari®es
emergency loan assistance and provides for a study of rural credit avail-
ability. Among the issues addressed are the types of loan assistance to be
made available, eligibility for credit assistance, and treatment of delinquent
borrowers. The Act distances credit from direct loans, in favor of guaran-
teeing loans (Hosansky 1996a). New restrictions on the purpose and length
of time for eligibility appear in the 1996 Farm Bill and repeal authority to
make loans for most non-agricultural purposes. In addition, the Act
targets lending to beginning, rather than established, farmers and ranchers.
It authorizes lines-of-credit for up to ®ve years, providing additional loan
opportunities for farmers. However, delinquent borrowers face tighter
restructuring rules, collection practices and expedited sales of forfeited
property. To qualify for emergency loan assistance, the law requires
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limits emergency assistance loan amounts to $500000 per farmer.
Finally, Title VI provides for a study to examine the rural demand for
credit and the current capacity and future ability of the current infrastruc-
ture to meet demands. As part of this examination, the study will invest-
igate the Federal Credit System (FCS), commercial banks, and other
federal agencies.
2.7 Title VII: rural development
Title VII consolidates existing rural development programmes and estab-
lishes new programmes targeted at rural infrastructure development. The
Act provides $100 million annually for telemedicine and distance learning
services, in which medical expertise and teaching are routed through new
information systems to rural areas. A renamed and reorganized Alternative
Agricultural Research and Commercialization Corporation continues to
make grants and loans directed towards non-traditional, non-food farm
and forest products, expanding industrial uses of agricultural commodities.
A consolidated source of rural development funds was created in the
Fund for Rural America, with approved ®nancing of $100 million
annually for 1997±1999. This fund provides money in equal proportions
for rural development projects, agricultural research, and discretionary
spending for rural development or research. In addition, Title VII estab-
lishes the Rural Community Advancement Program (RCAP). RCAP
reorganizes and expands rural development infrastructure spending in
three areas: rural community facilities, rural utilities, and rural business
and cooperatives. The legislation also authorizes $590 million for water
and waste facility loans and grants, provides $50 million in funding for the
Rural Cooperative Development Grant Program, authorizes the National
Sheep Industry Improvement Center, and establishes a Rural Venture
Capital Demonstration Program.
2.8 Title VIII: research, extension and education
Title VIII provides broad reauthorization for existing programmes, subject
to appropriations limits, from 1998±2002 (Young and Shields 1996). It
appropriates funds for agricultural research, extension, and education
programmes at 1995 levels through to 1997. The new legislation establishes
the National Agricultural Research, Extension, Education and Economics
Advisory Board. Furthermore, the law directs the Agriculture Secretary to
develop a system to monitor research and extension projects. The title
expands animal health and disease research, repeals authorization for a
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citrus fruit pests. In addition, it provides for higher education research
grants and amends the process for reviewing proposals for agricultural
research facilities.
2.9 Title IX: miscellaneous
Title IX provides guidelines for the humane transportation of horses,
amends the Plant Protection Variety Act, amends the Swine Health Protec-
tion Act, and provides for the collection and use of agricultural quarantine
and inspection fees. It also establishes the Safe Meat and Poultry Inspec-
tion Panel and provides for overseas inspections of agricultural imports.
Finally, it authorizes operation of the USDA Graduate School as a non-
appropriated, non-federal entity and provides for the expenses of the
USDA student internship programme.
3. Prices and politics of the 1996 legislation
The ®nal form of the 1996 Bill is attributed to many factors. Prior to
passage, analysts singled out budget concerns as the primary force driving
change. Yet in the year or more of consideration, federal de®cit projections
fell signi®cantly. In retrospect, some authors attribute the reform elements
not so much to budget concerns but to the Republican control of
Congress and the rise of commodity prices during legislative consideration
(Orden, Paarlberg and Roe 1996a, 1996b). The ®nal Farm Bill calls for
costly additional programmes such as rural development and environ-
mental initiatives. This, combined with the continuation of relatively costly
policies such as export subsidies, suggests that budget concerns faded as
consideration went on (The Economist 1996).
Market conditions, in contrast, played an increasingly central role in the
formation of the AMTA contained in the FAIR Act of 1996. Here, we
will focus especially on global and domestic markets for corn and wheat,
which together accounted for the majority of prior programme spending.
During 1995±96 grain prices rose to record highs and world grain ending
stocks fell to their lowest levels in 25 years, as global consumption
outpaced production. Poor growing conditions and market-distorting
agricultural policies created production shortfalls in the exporting
countries, as economic development and population growth stimulated
demand in the importing counties. China, previously a net exporter, began
importing feedgrains in 1995 (Smith 1996). In the United States, 1995 corn
production suered from below trend yields combined with a low number
of acres planted and adverse weather factors. As a result, production fell
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disease problems hindered the ability to predict production levels,
increasing price uncertainty (USDA 1995a). Lower production, combined
with strong domestic and foreign demand, resulted in depleted reserve
stocks, which fell 24 per cent to 6.1 billion bushels, the lowest level in the
United States in 50 years (Smith 1996). Wheat production in 1995 suered
from a similar reduction in area planted, area harvested and lower yields.
In addition, winter wheat in 1995/96 experienced adverse weather condi-
tions leading to a 6 per cent drop in US production (USDA 1996). Corn
prices started 1995 at $2.19 a bushel and steadily increased to $3.07 by
December. The prices continued to rise during 1996, starting at $3.09 in
January and rising to $4.49 by August. January 1995 wheat sold for $3.69
increasing to $4.88 by year end. Wheat prices rose during much of 1996
from $4.83 a bushel in January to a high of $5.73 in May. However, in
July wheat prices declined slightly from the high to $4.87 (USDA 1995/96).
Thus, while the debate surrounding the Farm Bill occurred, commodity
prices rose, along with predictions for higher future prices. High prices for
corn and wheat, based not only on supply shortfalls but predictions of
strong global demand, created opportunities for policy change (Thrane
1996). As the cost of de®ciency payments and thus producer bene®ts under
the previous legislation shrank in reaction to rising market prices, farmers
were required to repay partial de®ciency payments received prior to
planting. Short supplies, rising prices, strong global markets and some
farmers' repayment situation helped make decoupled transition payments
appear a better alternative than continued low levels of de®ciency payments.
Future commodity prices and stocks continue to aect the 1996 Farm
Bill in terms of producer and public acceptance. Low stocks and continued
global demand suggest that prices will remain high for corn and wheat for
the next two to three years, at a minimum (USDA 1996). In the public
mind, high marketing receipts due to high prices, with transition payments
loaded on top, are likely to further the perception of excessive transfers to
farmers. Supporters of the Bill argued during passage that the payments
were a mechanism of transition from decades of subsidization. However,
as Congress seeks to limit welfare bene®ts to low income non-farm house-
holds, and to reduce Social Security and Medicare bene®ts, seven years of
transfer payments to relatively wealthy farmers may oend advocates of
both ®scal responsibility and fairness.
The fairness issue, under both new and older legislation, turns on the
concentration of payments in the hands of the largest producers. Under
previous Farm Bill legislation, 90 per cent of the direct payments accrued
to the largest farms, representing just 18 per cent of all farmers. The
remaining 10 per cent of the direct payments went to a group of small and
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64 per cent of farmers received no direct payments at all (Runge,
Schmittker and Penny 1995). Under the 1996 Farm Bill direct payments
will remain based on the number of acres under production, so that the
largest farmers will continue to receive the lion's share of the government
bene®ts regardless of their level of need.
4. Party and politics
For four and a half decades during the Democratic control of Congress,
coalitions servicing farm interests formed around crop, regional and
subcommittee interests rather than political parties, creating a bipartisan
basis for maintaining existing subsidy programmes. The election of 1994,
in which control passed to Republican hands, called into question this
tradition (Paarlberg and Orden 1996). This section considers the political
process and the role political parties played in shaping the Farm Bill.
The long and arduous political process that generated the ®nal form of
the 1996 Farm Bill began with proposals geared towards reducing the cost
of the programmes contained in the 1990 legislation. The proposals
consisted of plans to cap the budget, provide revenue assurance, and
increase non-payment acres. Proposals to decouple payments from the
market and crop grown existed but received little attention (Orden,
Paarlberg and Roe 1996a). During this process, priorities diered between
both House and Senate and Democrats and Republicans. The Republican
House leadership advocated deregulation and a plan to cap entitlement
spending, based on a perceived mandate for budget constraint and policy
reform arising from 1994 Congressional victories and Speaker Gingrich's
`Contract for America'. The Senate, also newly under Republican control,
advocated a more moderate approach that included conservation and
nutrition initiatives. The Democratic Clinton administration, meanwhile,
endorsed the continuation of a long-term safety net for farmers, additional
planting ¯exibility, increased conservation measures, new rural develop-
ment initiatives and the extension of nutrition programmes. Democrats in
the House and Senate shared these general priorities, and also re¯ected
regional devotion to continuation of cotton, rice, peanut, tobacco and
sugar programmes.
The Agricultural Market Transition Act, Title I of the 1996 Farm Bill,
began its political life in the House as the 1995 Freedom to Farm Act.
Agriculture Committee chair Representative Pat Roberts (R) switched
from a supporter of the existing farm programmes to an advocate of
decoupled payments as commodity prices rose. While rising commodity
prices decreased direct payments to farmers under the 1990 Farm Bill, the
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conditions. Yet the Freedom to Farm Act initially faced substantial
opposition from other members of the House Agriculture Committee and
the Clinton administration. Rice and cotton interests in particular feared
change, and blocked passage of the Act in committee. In order to keep the
Freedom to Farm proposal alive, Roberts convinced Republican leaders to
incorporate it into Title I of the larger Balanced Budget Act, eectively
circumventing his own committee vote, at least for a time (Orden,
Paarlberg and Roe 1996a).
However, President Clinton vetoed the Budget, which threw Freedom to
Farm back into Congress, where Roberts began trying to consolidate a
coalition among diverse agricultural interests to support a revision. This
coalition included representatives tied to ®eld crops, sugar, peanuts, dairy
products, cotton, and rice. Each group was granted concessions which
appear in the ®nal version of the Farm Bill. Field crops gained by
receiving transition payments on top of record high commodity prices.
Sugar and peanut programmes escaped all but minor reform. The dairy
programme experienced moderate reform acceptable to dairy interests.
Finally, cotton and rice interests received special price support in the form
of an established price ¯oor in the loan rate provisions. Roberts faced
opposition from urban liberals and conservative suburban representatives
who targeted farm programmes generally, and the sugar and peanut
programme in particular, for elimination (Hosansky 1996b). This increased
the importance of enlarging the coalition to account for the non-farm
interests. Despite some opposition, the Senate passed a version of the
Freedom to Farm Act. What was then necessary was to marshall
Democratic support in the House and the Clinton administration. This
was ultimately achieved by including conservation programmes, rural
development and nutrition initiatives, trade programmes and a provision
that allowed `permanent law' to come back into eect at the end of the
seven-year contract period, unless overturned by a future Congress.
Initially, the administration and Senate Democrats resisted the concept
of transition payments decoupled from the market. Under previous Farm
Bills, de®ciency payment subsidies increased when farm prices fell and
decreased when farm prices rose, providing a `countercyclical' policy
instrument. Under the new legislation, payments remain ®xed whether
farm income rises or crashes, providing farmers with a windfall during
favourable market conditions and possibly de®cient income support if the
market turns in two or three years. The only remnants of a true safety net,
non-recourse loans and permanent legislation, are too low or too far o to
oer any real security in the event of downturn. In any case, retaining
permanent law would cause a reversion in the year 2002 to 1950 levels of
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and budget constraints (Hosansky 1996b).
The Democratic administration conservation programme requirements
included continuation of the CRP and WRP, and an increase in
mandatory spending for cost-sharing expenditures. Bipartisan support
existed for the creation of a programme aimed at restoration and conserva-
tion of the Florida everglades. The administration also advocated the
inclusion of rural development initiatives for telemedicine, distance
learning, rural infrastructure, agricultural research, rural credit and other
programmes. In summary, in order to garner support for ®xed declining
transition payments, Republicans succumbed to sugar, peanut, and dairy
interests. Democrats demanded conservation initiatives, rural development
funding, food stamp programme funding, and the retention of permanent
legislation. The ultimate outcome of this political `logrolling' was
something midway between fundamental reform and convenient retention
of other approaches. The 1996 FAIR Act aords farmers the freedom to
plant for market and weather conditions, as well as the freedom to fail,
unless risk-sharing devices such as futures markets, marketing consultants,
forward contracts, and insurance are actively utilized (Thrane 1996). The
Act also removes the government from the business of managing price and
supply. The new legislation no longer leads the government into sending
mixed signals by setting high price support levels that increase production,
on the one hand, and by limiting acres under ARPs, on the other. Further-
more, the 1996 Farm Bill prevents cost overruns by capping spending on
agricultural programmes for the ®rst time.
However, the Act failed to address many issues including the income
disparity generated by the programme, a concrete schedule for ending
subsidies, signi®cant budget savings, elimination of EEP, and rationaliza-
tion of CRP rental rates (Orden, Paarlberg and Roe 1996a). In addition,
the reform contained in the new legislation occurs for the most part in
Title I. The remainder of the titles experienced modi®cations but escaped
any radical reform. The inclusion of 9 titles in the Farm Bill signals the
continuation of logrolling in the formation and passage of the Farm Bill.
The question remains whether or not the change to ®xed transition
payment will result in the ®nal permanent decoupling of farm subsidies
from the market and crop planted. Already the Act faces challenges under
the appropriations process.
5. Finishing the agenda
An alternative approach to the current dilemma posed by a combination
of high market prices and large contract payments would be to allow
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receive them later if and when prices fall. The eect of such a deferral
would be to retain the sanctity of the contract, but to extend its applica-
tion to later years. This would reduce budget expenditures in the next
several high price years, and convert the contract to a countercyclical
policy in which payments function as a hedge against declining prices
rather than a lump sum (but declining) windfall.
Some explanation of the second-best nature of this policy prescription is
in order. First, the contracts signed by the vast majority of base acreage
holders are essentially a ®xed constraint, despite their egregious eects on
the distributive allocation of government receipts. Second, in a period in
which high crop prices are likely to be capitalized rapidly into land values,
there is reason to avoid additional ratcheting up of these values through
direct transfers to producers. Hence, if farmers are allowed to voluntarily
`bank' contract payments for later use and avoid current taxation, an
element of countercyclicity will be combined with the political appeal of
less transparent transfers, without direct violation of the contractual
obligation established in 1996 law. Of course, the decision to exercise this
option would be a function for farmers of the marginal tax savings set
against the present value of the future contract payment, in relation to the
expected level of future prices.
One interesting question is whether the extenuation of the contract
should be a fully voluntarily individual decision, or should be applied by
USDA to all contracts under the 1996 legislation. Subsidiary questions are
whether individuals should be free to defer all, some, or none of their
contract payment, as suited their own needs, and whether the advantages
of deferral should be greater if farmers are smaller, or are prepared to
engage in environmental or other initiatives. In any case, the payment
deferral could be exempted from current taxes, analogous to an Individual
Retirement Account (IRA). This may have considerable appeal given the
marginal tax liability likely for the largest farmers, receiving high market
receipts and large contract payments in the next few years. In general,
advocates of strict adherence to the contract are more likely to favour the
®rst, voluntary option. But one consequence of the voluntary approach is
that by 2002, some farmers will have `banked' more contract funds than
others, creating a divided constituency for new approaches to policy. On
the other hand, a general withholding of contract payments by USDA
might be interpreted as a breach of contract, and would more likely, at
minimum, require new legislation.
Apart from attempts to extend the contract under Title I, and make it
countercyclical, an additional part of completing a reform agenda is likely
to include eorts to bring the `excluded' commodities, notably dairy,
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payments scheme now aecting the other programme commodities. This
will be complicated, both politically and in terms of programme details,
but would represent a real achievement in establishing new, more trade-
neutral policy measures for these commodities.
Finally, it is arguable that future agricultural policy will continue to shift
towards agro-environmental themes, in which market and non-market
mechanisms are combined to promote new environmental initiatives
(Runge 1996). These initiatives will require better targeting of incentives:
taxes, subsidies, and penalties, to the recognized impacts of agriculture on
water quality, chemical residues and biodiversity. While some aspects of
the 1996 Farm Bill re¯ect this recognition, 1994 victories by Republicans
in the House and Senate put a temporary chill into environmental policy
initiatives. The policy environment for these initiatives now appears to be
waning.
In conclusion, the 1996 Farm Bill represents an un®nished reform
agenda. Still needed, in the authors' view, are measures to induce greater
countercyclicity and equity into lump-sum compensation under Title I, as
well as greater coverage of commodities largely uncovered by reform.
Finally, we would argue that the survival of direct compensation schemes
in the future will hinge in large measure on whether public perceptions
improve of agriculture's impact on the natural environment.
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